“What sort of relationship can exist between competition (antitrust) law and anti-dumping? They stem from entirely different realms…” Those were the exact words my friend from the Ministry of Foreign Trade shared with me when I embarked on writing this thesis…
As a consequence, this thesis stands as a pioneer in amalgamating concepts from two distinct domains and dissecting their interactions. Moreover, though not explicitly accentuated within the thesis, it highlights a pivotal aspect for the business, bureaucratic, and political arenas: If we effectively conclude the Competition Chapter during Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, the potential for the EU to impose trade measures like anti-dumping on products originating from Turkey will be nullified…
In this context, the focal points addressed in this study can be succinctly summarized as follows:
The practice of a dominant company resorting to predatory pricing with the intention of expelling competitors from the market isn’t a frequently encountered violation and mustn’t be conflated with price reduction, which is a natural byproduct of healthy competition. Consequently, ascertaining the existence of predatory pricing necessitates a thorough analysis of the company’s market influence, market structure, and price-cost dynamics, with a concerted effort to avoid intervention whenever possible.
Dumping, both in its theoretical framework and identification, deviates from predatory pricing, and anti-dumping measures culminate in constricting domestic market competition. Hence, advocating for the replacement of anti-dumping measures with competition rules could be posited. Nonetheless, due to the challenges posed by the international application of competition law, an entire abandonment of anti-dumping measures isn’t a pragmatic approach. Conversely, customs unions provide an optimal milieu for realizing this proposition.
The practices observed within the European Union and ANZCERTA have evidenced the feasibility of competition rules supplanting anti-dumping measures. Similarly, contemplating the Customs Union regulations between the European Union and Turkey lends credence to this notion. Article 44 of Association Council Decision No. 1/95 necessitates full market openness and congruous application of competition rules in both markets for the suspension of anti-dumping measures. This compels the Competition Authority to factor this consideration into its exemption and barriers to entry evaluations, emphasizing the alignment of its practices with those of the EU.
Furthermore, within the prevailing regulations, when infringements arise from enterprises in one party’s jurisdiction that impact and are instigated by the other party, the provisions outlined in the Association Council Decision are insufficient. Consequently, the existing regulations need modification, mirroring the ANZCERTA paradigm. During this transformation, the Competition Authority plays an indispensable role.
Type of the Work: Book
Language : Turkish
Copyright : Turkish Competition Authority
Citation : EKDİ, Barış, Gümrük Birliği Çerçevesinde Damping ve Yıkıcı Fiyat Uygulamaları, Rekabet Kurumu Yayınları -Uzmanlık Tezi , 2003.
