Vertical restraints are commonly perceived as mechanisms that enhance efficiency and are typically evaluated within the context of an exemption system. Nevertheless, situations arise where the convergence of vertical restraints and market power can pose a substantial threat to healthy market competition.
As a result, this study delves into the circumstances under which vertical restraints might serve as tools for market foreclosure, with a focus on the regulatory framework. It explores the link between Articles 4 and 6 of the Competition Law and vertical restraints, drawing insights from decisions rendered by the Competition Authority.
Originally presented as a paper during the Symposium on Current Developments in Competition Law, jointly organized by the Competition Authority and Erciyes University in 2004, this text comprises both the introductory theoretical framework section of the master’s thesis endorsed by the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law and a succinct overview of Turkey’s practical applications.
An expanded and updated rendition of this research has been released by the Competition Authority in the form of a book titled “Vertical Agreements of Dominant Firms Which Create Market Foreclosure.”
